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In Defense of Geographic Disparity 
Craig Allen Nard† 
One of the most controversial issues in international patent law re-
lates to “biopiracy,” which concerns the exploitation of indigenous tradi-
tional knowledge by Western1 firms without justly compensating the 
keepers of the knowledge.2 A high-profile example is the neem tree con-
troversy.3 The leaves and bark of the neem tree, which is indigenous to 
India, have been used as natural pesticides and medicine by the people of 
India for years.4 In the early 1990s, a multinational company, W.R. 
Grace, obtained United States and European patents on pesticide prod-
ucts derived from the neem tree.5 One of the European patents was in-
†  Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law, Technology, and the Arts, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law.  I am grateful to Olufunmilayo Arewa, Gra-
ham Dutfield, Christopher Heath F. Scott Kieff, and Marco Ricolfi for their helpful com-
ments. 
 1. The term “Western” is used here to refer to the developed world; however, in the 
context of traditional knowledge it is common to use the terms “North” and “South,” 
whereby the North represents the developed world. 
 2. Traditional knowledge is susceptible to multiple definitions. See Graham Dut-
field, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 
240–42 (2001) (discussing difficulty in defining traditional knowledge); see also Intellec-
tual Property Needs and Expectations of Traditional Knowledge Holders 25, World Intel-
lectual Property Organization (April 2001), 
http://www.wipo.org/globalissues/tk/ffm/report/final/pdf/part1.pdf [hereinafter Intellectual 
Property Needs. In this essay, I am only concerned with technical or scientific knowledge.   
As with traditional knowledge, there is no accepted definition of “biopiracy.”  
Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy 74, Commission on Intel-
lectual Property Rights (September 2002), 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfulllfinal.pdf.To the extent 
meaning can be gleaned from examples, I am concerned with Western firms, who make a 
genuine inventive contribution, but, unfortunately, fail to (1) obtain the consent of the 
holders of traditional knowledge, and (2) equitably compensate the holders from rents 
earned from the commercial exploitation of the invention. See generally id. 
 3. The controversy has been well mined by commentators. See, e.g., VANDANA 
SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 69–73 (1997); Emily 
Marden, The Neem Tree Patent: International Conflict over the Commodification of Life, 
22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 279, 283-86 (1999). 
 4. SHIVA, supra note 3, at 69–73. 
 5. See, e.g., European Patent No. 0436 257 B1 (issued Sept. 14, 1994) (patenting a 
“[m]ethod for controlling fungi on plants by the aid of . . . neem 
oil”),http://l2.espacenet.com/espacenet/bnsviewer?CY=ep&LG=en&DB=EPD&PN=EP04
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validated as lacking novelty,6 but the validity of the American patents 
remained intact. The central reason for this difference is that unlike 
European patent law, the United States patent code distinguishes between 
prior knowledge and use in foreign countries and prior knowledge and 
use in the United States.7 Specifically, American patent law does not rec-
ognize as prior art knowledge and use in a foreign country, such as that 
involved in the neem case.8
This geographic disparity in the American patent code has been the 
subject of much criticism,9 most recently by Professor Margo A. Bagley 
of Emory University School of Law.10 In her well-written article, Profes-
sor Bagley contends that the geographic limitation of 35 U.S.C. § 102 is 
unconstitutional and bad policy.11 I challenge those assertions. By advo-
cating the elimination of this geographic disparity and thereby allowing 
foreign knowledge and use to serve as prior art, Professor Bagley seeks 
to protect developing nations and indigenous peoples from Western 
countries’ patent law regimes.12 In contrast, I argue for a proactive ap-
proach whereby patent rights serve not only to induce the commercializa-
tion of products derived from traditional knowledge, but also to compen-
sate the keepers of traditional knowledge, while respecting the need to 
conserve the host country’s biodiversity.13 Under this approach, the geo-
graphic disparity in American patent law is crucial. 
Professor Bagley asserts that the geographic distinction in § 102 is 
unconstitutional because it “allows the patenting of inventions in the 
public domain.”14 According to Professor Bagley, the Framers of the 
Intellectual Property Clause (IP Clause), expressed in Article I, Section 
8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, were skeptical of 
36257&ID=EP+++0436257B1+I+. 
 6. See Press Release, Eurpean Patent Office, “Neem tree oil” case: European patent 
No. 0436 257 revoked (MONTH DAY, YEAR), http://www.european-
patentoffice.org/news/pressrel/2000_05_11_e.htm. The invalidated European patent was 
specifically challenged by two Indian non-governmental organizations. 
 7. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b) (2000). 
 8. See id.  Although foreign knowledge and use cannot be used as prior art, foreign 
inventive activity (i.e., conception and reduction to practice) can serve as proof of date of 
invention for purposes of obtaining patent rights. See 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2000). 
 9. See, e.g., Leanne M. Fecteau, The Ayahuasca Patent Revocation: Raising Ques-
tions About Current U.S. Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 69 (2001); Shayana Kadidal, 
Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiversity, Foreign Prior Art and the Neem Tree Contro-
versy, 37 IDEA 371 (1997). 
 10. See Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation 
on Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679 (2003). 
 11. See id. at 679–91. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See infra notes 36–66 and accompanying text. 
 14. Bagley, supra note 10, at 687. 
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and “sought to avoid the granting of patents on ‘old’ information.”15 
Novelty is indeed the sine qua non of patent protection, but I believe 
Professor Bagley’s conception of the “public domain” is too broad and 
does not fully take into account the utilitarian nature of American patent 
law.16 While it is true that the Framers drafted the IP Clause in the 
shadow of abusive monopolistic practices,17 the driving force behind the 
clause was the enhancement of public welfare.18 Section 102 of the 
patent code is consistent with utilitarianism because the geographic 
distinction provides an incentive to invest in and commercialize products 
derived from traditional knowledge—products that otherwise would most 
likely remain undeveloped or out of reach for a vast majority of potential 
beneficiaries.19 Moreover, the wealth created from commercialization 
could, indeed should, be shared with the host country and keepers of the  
 15. Id. at 685. 
 16. The preamble of the IP clause, “To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts,” is expressed in utilitarian terms. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Yochai Benkler, 
Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
23, 59 (2001) (noting that “the basic ideological commitment of American intellectual 
property is actually heavily utilitarian, not Lockean or Hegelian”); Linda R. Cohen & 
Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 
453–61 (2001) (asserting that “the conceptual model underlying American intellectual 
property law is utilitarian: rights are granted for social objectives (advancing knowledge 
and producing useful products)”). Compare the philosophical influences of European intel-
lectual property law, which is grounded in Kantian and Hegelian notions of personality, 
inalienability, and self-expression. Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the 
Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 7 (1997) (noting that “European intellectual property 
law . . . derives in large part from a concept of property developed by Immanuel Kant and 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel”). 
 17. See Graham v. John Deere Co. 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (“The [IP] clause is both a 
grant of power and a limitation. . . . It was written against the backdrop of the prac-
tices⎯eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies⎯of the [English] Crown in 
granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been 
enjoyed by the public.”); see also EDWARD WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS 
OF THE USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 1787-1836 39 
(1998).  According to one scholar, “it is precisely because the delegates were familiar with 
the Statute of Monopolies . . . that they were not about to give the Congress any general 
power to create monopolies. . . . If therefore they were to give power to Congress to secure 
exclusive rights for limited times to inventors in their discoveries, it was necessary to do 
so expressly. 
 18. As the Supreme Court stated in Mazer v. Stein, “The economic philosophy be-
hind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public wel-
fare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’” 347 U.S. 
201, 219 (1954). 
 19. See generally WESLEY M. COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL 
ASSETS: APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS 
PATENT (OR NOT) PAGE, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 
2000), http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7552.v5.pdf (showing empirical evidence indicating 
the importance of patent rights to the pharmaceutical industry); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 289, 289 n.1 (2003) (noting that “[v]arious empirical studies have underscored the 
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deed should, be shared with the host country and keepers of the tradi-
tional knowledge.20 The prospect of a patent allows for wealth creation 
and access to products based on traditional knowledge in a manner that 
benefits many more people than would otherwise have benefited,21 and it 
is this result the Framers sought to promote.22
Professor Bagley makes several points relating to the policy ramifi-
cations of § 102’s geographic distinction.23 Citing the neem tree exam-
ple, Professor Bagley states that “[i]f [W.R.] Grace patented the same in-
vention in the United States, where § 102(b)’s geographical limitation 
would bar evidence of public use of the invention in India, European 
consumers could have competitive market access to an invention only 
available to U.S. consumers at monopoly pricing levels.”24 My initial re-
sponse to this statement is: at least there is a product on the market. It is 
reasonable to assume that, absent a geographic distinction (i.e., absent 
patent rights), a pharmaceutical firm would not invest millions of dollars 
in commercialization efforts, thus depriving all consumers.25 Moreover, 
exploiting the patent in the rich United States market26 could lead to sig-
nificant profits that would form part of a benefit-sharing arrangement.27  
critical role played by patents on end-stage pharmaceutical products”); Michael A. Carrier, 
Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 831 (2002) (observing 
that patent incentives in pharmaceutical industry are “critical”). 
 20. See infra notes 49–72; see also F. Scott Kieff, Patents for Environmentalists, 9 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 307, 317–18 (2002) (discussing how the commercialization of 
products derived from biodiversity can, under a patent system, benefit the custodians of 
the biodiversity). 
 21. It is worth noting that a significant portion of pharmaceuticals are derived from 
plants. See Charles R. McManis, The Interface Between International Intellectual Prop-
erty and Environmental Protection: Biodiversity and Biotechnology, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 
255, 273 (1998) (“About one-quarter of all prescription drugs in the United States contain 
as their active ingredient a compound extracted or derived from plants”); Thomas Eisner, 
Chemical Prospecting: A Proposal for Action, in ECOLOGY, ECONOMICS, ETHICS: THE 
BROKEN CIRCLE 198 (F.H. Bormann & S. Kellert eds. 1991) (“Drugs from nature make 
up a large fraction of our pharmaceutical arsenal. In the United States alone, upwards of 
one-quarter of all medical prescriptions involve formulations based on plant or microbial 
products or on derivatives or synthetic versions thereof”). 
 22. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. 
 23. See Bagley, supra note 10, at 688-91. 
 24. Bagley, supra note 10, at 688. 
 25. See infra notes 41–47 and accompanying text. 
 26. In 2002, more than half (53.4%) of the pharmaceutical industry’s revenues were 
from sales in the United States. PATENTED MEDICINE PRICES REVIEW BOARD ANNUAL 
REPORT 19 (2002), http://www.pmprbe.com/CMFiles/ ar2002e21LEF-6252003-6142.pdf. 
Germany accounted for 6.2%, France 5.3%, the United Kingdom 3.9%, and Italy 3.7%.  
Id.; see generally Jean O. Lanjouw, A New Global Patent Regime for Diseases: U.S. and 
International Legal Issues, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 102–03 (2002) (proposing a patent 
enforcement mechanism that would “maintain research incentives . . . limited to diseases 
with markets that are concentrated in the rich countries”). 
 27. See infra notes 49–66 and accompanying text. It is for this reason that other 
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Furthermore, Professor Bagley’s market-differential scenario is un-
remarkable given the lack of uniformity among patent law regimes. The 
availability of a patent on any type of inventive contribution varies from 
country to country, depending on eligible subject matter or a particular 
reading of patentability requirements. Consider, for example, how 
American patent law treats biotechnology vis-à-vis the European patent 
law. In 1998, the European Parliament, concerned about the competitive 
threat of a robust American biotech industry, issued a biotechnology di-
rective codifying patent protection for biotech-related inventions.28 The 
directive was over ten years in the making and has been adopted by only 
a minority of EC member states, despite a deadline of July 30, 2000. One 
of the principal points of contention among several countries29 and po-
litical parties30 in adopting the directive continues to be the patenting of 
DNA sequences, which is stridently opposed on grounds of public moral-
ity.31 This intra-EU discordance over biotech patents highlights an im-
portant distinction between the American and European patent systems. 
wealthy markets for pharmaceuticals (i.e., Europe and Japan) should amend their patent 
laws and adopt a prior art geographic distinction. 
 28. See Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 
1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, art. 3, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 
18 [hereinafter “European Parliament Directive”]. 
 29. The Netherlands, who unsuccessfully brought legal action against the EU Par-
liament to annul the Directive, and France, are the two most prominent opponents. See 
Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the 
United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a 
Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1657 (2001). Even though the French gov-
ernment was not a party to the Dutch lawsuit, “French officials [were] especially vigorous 
in their efforts to circumscribe the patenting of human DNA sequences. French President 
Jacques Chirac [] stressed ‘the need to prevent any possibility of patenting the discovery 
of a gene, except for its therapeutic or diagnostic applications.’” Id. (citations omitted) 
(internal quotations marks omitted). 
 30. The Green Party and environmentalists have been particularly vociferous in their 
opposition to the European Parliament Directive.  
 31. In an attempt to address this concern, Article 6(1) of the Directive states that in-
ventions are “unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to 
ordre public or morality.” European Parliament Directive, supra note 28, art. 6(1) at 18. 
This section mirrors Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention, which excludes 
from patent protection “inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be con-
trary to ordre public or morality.” European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 53(a), 
1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 272. For an excellent discussion of the public morality requirement in 
the context of biotechnology, see Marco Ricolfi, Biotechnology, Patents and Epistemic 
Approaches, 5 J. BIOLAW & BUS. (Bio-Ethix Special Supplement) 77 (2002). The public 
mortality argument against patenting DNA sequences is all but a whisper in American law 
circles. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising from 
Mixing Mice and Men, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 247, 249 (2000). “Although courts once 
relied on ‘moral utility’ to deny patent protection for inventions used solely for gambling 
or fraud, no court has relied on this doctrine since the PTO Board of Appeals held that an 
invention used solely for gambling could be patentable in the 1977 decision of Ex parte 
Murphy.” Id. 
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Like its counterpart in the United States, the European Patent Office 
(EPO) has issued patents on human DNA.32 Contrary to the American 
system, however, a patent granted by the EPO matures into individual 
national patents (as designated by the applicant), which are governed by 
their respective national laws. There is no such thing as a European pat-
ent that is valid throughout the entire EU. Member states, which often 
have divergent interpretations of the European Patent Convention, retain 
jurisdiction over issues of infringement and scope of patent protection,33 
thus increasing the likelihood of disparate enforcement.34 Therefore, 
while great strides have been made toward patent harmonization within 
the EU and throughout the world, uniformity among nations remains un-
realized.35
Professor Bagley also notes that the United States condemns the pi-
rating of American intellectual property by trading partners, yet the geo-
graphic disparity in § 102(b) “facilitates the ‘pirating’ of unpatented, un-
published, traditional knowledge.”36 I agree that the United States has 
been willing to “push and prod developing countries into accepting intel-
lectual property rules,”37 and that Western firms should compensate 
keepers of traditional knowledge.38 As Professor Balgey notes, however, 
 32. See http://www.pixunlimited.co.uk/guardian/pdf/Patenthuman.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2003) (listing patents for partial human gene sequences). 
 33. See European Patent Convention, supra note 31, arts. 64, 138, 1065 U.N.T.S. at 
295–96; see also Friedrich-Karl Beier, The European Patent System, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 462, 464 (Frederick Abbott et al. 
eds., 1999) 
 34. An oft-cited example of disparate enforcement is the “Epilady” patent litigation 
in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. For a history of the litigation, see 
Sanford T. Colb, The Epilady Hair Remover Litigation, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY SERIES 1993: SUCCESSFUL MULTI-COUNTRY PATENT LEGISLATION 
STRATEGIES 107 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 1993). 
 35. A recent example of divergent patentability requirements is the Canadian Su-
preme Court case involving Harvard University’s onco-mouse. See Commissioner of Pat-
ents v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, [2002] D.L.R. (4th) 577. This transgenic 
mammal has been patented in several countries, but the Supreme Court of Canada refused 
to extend patent protection because a higher life form, in the Court’s opinion, is not a 
“composition of matter” or “article of manufacture” under Section 2 of the Canadian Pat-
ent Act. See id. at 578–79; Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 4 (1970) (Can.).  Interestingly, 
the Canadian Supreme Court refused to follow the lead of the famous American case, 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), and its well known language: “Congress 
intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’” 
Id. at 309.  
 36. Bagley, supra note 10, at 688–89. 
 37. PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM 100 (2002) 
(discussing United States’ use of  “Special” 301, and amendment to Section 182 of the 
Trade Act of 1974, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000)). 
 38. See infra notes 49–66 and accompanying text. 
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traditional knowledge is unpublished39 and, I would suggest, un-
derutilized. The virtue of a patent is its ability to “smoke out” this 
knowledge and to provide an inducement for firms to develop products 
derived therefrom⎯products that otherwise may not be realized. I am not 
suggesting that patent rights can solve all suboptimal innovation patterns 
across all industries, and I am sympathetic to concerns prompted by re-
cent proprietary trends in intellectual property law. My focus here is only 
on pharmaceuticals, an industry that relies heavily on patent rights.40
In addition, Professor Bagley argues that the geographic distinction 
no longer makes sense because information is generally more accessible 
today than it was in 1836, when the distinction found its way into the 
patent law.41 Though the assumed rationale for the geographic limitation 
may be anachronistic,42 doing away with it (and therefore the prospect of 
patent rights) would obstruct wealth creation. Professor Bagley suggests, 
however, that even if the geographic distinction is removed, pharmaceu-
tical firms “can still deliver new drugs based on traditional knowledge” 
as long as the drugs are novel and nonobvious.43 Perhaps, but I am not as 
sanguine as she. First, the pharmaceutical company brings something to 
the table by way of testing and refining products—endeavors that are 
quite costly and not necessarily lacking in inventive contribution. Sec-
ond, and more directly responsive, establishing and documenting the pre-
cise prior art parameters of traditional knowledge, preserved mainly in 
oral histories, is a difficult undertaking.44 Blurred prior art boundaries 
 39. See Bagley, supra note 10, at 688–89; see also infra notes 44–47 and accompa-
nying text.  
 40. See supra note 19. This essay does not address the important issue of drug access 
in the developing world such as that which played out in South Africa a few years ago. 
Rather, I am concerned with patent law’s incentive dynamic as it relates to traditional 
knowledge and notions of benefit sharing. 
 41. Bagley, supra note 10, at 712–24. 
 42. For a historical discussion of the geographic distinction in § 102, see Donald S. 
Chisum, Foreign Activity: Its Effect on Patentability Under United States Law, 11 INT’L 
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 26, 33–42 (1980). 
 43. Bagley, supra note 10, at 719. 
 44. As Graham Baines states: 
An investigator of traditional knowledge faces a daunting challenge, 
and many difficulties. Irrespective of “scientific objectivity”, (sic) 
differences of perception, values and language between those who 
hold traditional knowledge and those who wish to document it and 
apply it are significant. Unless investigators of traditional knowledge 
make more effort to understand these differences and to develop ef-
fective investigative methods then, at best, incomplete revelations of 
traditional knowledge will result. At worst, the information obtained 
will prove misleading. 
See Graham B.K. Baines, Conclusion: Issues in the Application of Traditional Knowledge 
to Environmental Science, in TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE: A COLLECTION 
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lead to uncertainty, which is undesirable in a property rights regime. 
Third, information is a classic public good,45 and, as a general matter, ac-
cessibility without exclusivity leads to serious inefficiency concerns.46 
The aforementioned uncertainties brought about by a change to § 102 
would weaken the prospect of a strong property right. As a result, in the 
pharmaceutical industry, private ordering and benefit-sharing would suf-
fer because traditional knowledge will not be optimally commercial-
ized.47
While it is true that this argument can apply to domestic knowledge 
OF ESSAYS 68 (Robert E. Johannes ed., 1989). 
There is indeed a movement afoot to document traditional knowledge. See, e.g., The 
World Bank Group’s Indigenous Knowledge Program, at 
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ik/index.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2003). The goals of this 
movement, however, must be defined. According to the World Bank, the “ultimate objec-
tive” of its internet-based indigenous knowledge program “is to help mainstream indige-
nous/traditional knowledge into the activities of development partners and to optimize the 
benefits of development assistance, especially to the poor.” Id. If the goal is to create pat-
ent-destroying prior art, then this movement seems to be misguided for reasons discussed 
in this essay, but it makes sense if the goal is to provide for a centralized database of tradi-
tional knowledge with an eye towards commercial exploitation. One must be careful, 
however, not to disclose too much, lest prior art be created. As Professor Coenraad Visser 
noted, “[i]f you want to exploit the traditional knowledge by means of compilation or a 
transfer technology agreement, then it is in your interest to disclose as little as possible in 
the agreement.” Coenraad Visser, Panel Remarks at Fordham Law School Symposim on 
Global Intellectual Property Rights, in The Law and Policy of Protecting Folklore, Tradi-
tional Knowledge, and Genetic Resources, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 753, 768 (2002). He goes on to suggest that the “solution . . . seems to be to tag 
only . . . [s]o you would list in the database only the items that are available for the trans-
fer of technology.” Id.  
 45. Public goods have two characteristics. They are nonrival (i.e., inexhaustible) and 
nonexclusive. A good is nonrival if consumption by one person does not leave any less of 
the good to be consumed by others. A good is nonexclusive if people cannot be excluded 
from consuming it. In addition to information, other public goods include national defense, 
television signals, and police protection.  
 46. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 102ND CONGRESS, FINDING A 
BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 185 (1992). According to a report by the Office of Technology 
Assessment, “Individuals have an incentive not to pay for the good, or to undervalue it, in 
hopes of getting access as ‘free riders.’ The inability to exclude free riders distorts market 
signals and is thought to result in inefficient allocation of resources to nonexclusive goods 
and underproduction of them, relative to socially optimal quantities.” Id. For a more de-
tailed discussion of public goods and the market failures associated with them, see 
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS, 33–38, 107–10, 120–22, 167–
72 (2004).  
 47. For a discussion of a commercialization-based patent system supported by a 
strong property right, see F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commer-
cializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, PAGE (2001); see also Edmund W. Kitch, 
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, PAGE (1977); Giles 
S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws (pts. 1–5), 
24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 85, 159, 241, 328, 422 (1942). 
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(i.e., knowledge within the United States), it is not my intent to read the 
knowledge and use provisions out of the patent code. Rather, I believe 
there is something special about traditional knowledge in developing 
countries.  Specifically, the patenting and commercial exploitation of 
products based on their traditional knowledge can bring much needed 
capital to these countries and their indigenous populations.48 
Professor Bagley and I are on common ground when she argues that 
indigenous peoples deserve to be compensated for the commercial ex-
ploitation of their traditional knowledge.49 This concern is important, 
however the problem here is not the availability of patent protection but 
rather the lack of an adequate compensatory mechanism for developing 
nations and indigenous peoples.50 Safeguards must be put in place so as 
to prevent “biopiracy” similar to the Hoodia cactus incident.51 The avail-
ability of patent protection must be accompanied by a compensatory 
structure and mutual consent so that the keepers of traditional knowledge 
will be equitably compensated, the sovereignty of the host nation re-
spected, and its biodiversity conserved. 
One way to accomplish these goals is through a contractual ar-
rangement and a notification provision52 that are consistent with the aims 
 48. Even if traditional knowledge were properly catalogued and thus rendered prior 
art under the current version of § 102, we may nonetheless want to treat this prior art as 
non-patent defeating. That is, if our goal is to provide incentives to commercialize prod-
ucts derived from traditional knowledge and enhance benefit-sharing opportunities, it may 
be desirable to have a developing nation prior art exception. This proposal may also help 
address the “how much to disclose” problem associated with documentation efforts dis-
cussed by Professor Visser. See supra note 44. 
 49. See Bagley, supra note 10, at 689 (noting the lack of equitable compensation for 
use of traditional knowledge). 
 50. See Dutfield, supra note 2, at 273 (asserting “that the exploitation of traditional 
peoples and communities, including holders of [traditional knowledge], is fundamentally 
due to a widespread failure to respect their basic rights”). 
 51. In 1996, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in South Af-
rica isolated and patented the active hunger-suppressing component, P57, of the Hoodia 
cactus. See Ginger Thompson, Bushmen Squeeze Money from a Humble Cactus, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2003, at A-4. The patent was subsequently licensed to the British firm, 
Phytopharm, who in turn licensed the patent to Pfizer for $21 million in payments. See 
Antony Barnett, In Africa the Hoodia Cactus Keeps Men Alive. Now Its Secret Is ‘Stolen’ 
to Make Us Thin, OBSERVER, June 17, 2001, http://education.guardian.co.uk/print/ 
0,3858,4205467-102275,00.html. The San people, who have known about the hunger-
suppressant qualities of the Hoodia cactus for thousands of years, were not told of the 
commercialization of the patented product and did not receive any remuneration from the 
sales thereof. Id. In fact, the Pfizer spokesman thought the San people were extinct. Id. 
After an international uproar, CSIR entered into an agreement with the San people recog-
nizing their traditional knowledge and paying them six percent of the royalties made from 
sales of the patented product. Id.  
 52. A full discussion of the notification requirement is beyond the scope of this es-
say. Such a requirement, however, could resemble the proposal made by the Colombian 
delegation at the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Third Session of the Standing 
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of patent law and biodiversity conservation. To this end, it is preferable, 
as Professor Marco Ricolfi has argued, to amend the domestic patent 
laws of developed countries to require lawful acquisition of genetic re-
sources and an equitable compensatory arrangement based on the com-
mercial exploitation of these resources.53 A less satisfactory, though 
Committee on the Law of Patents. See Protection of Biological and Genetic Resources, 
WIPO, WIPO Doc. SCP/3/10 (Sept. 8, 1999), 
http://www.wipo.org/scp/en/documents/session_3/pdf/scp3_10.pdf. The proposal stated: 
Every document shall specify the registration number of the contract 
affording access to genetic resources and a copy thereof where the 
goods or services for which protection is sought have been manufac-
tured or developed from genetic resources, or products thereof, of 
which one of the member countries is the country of origin. 
Id. Consent could be subsumed within the duty to disclose all information material to pat-
entability under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2002) (detailing the duty to 
disclose material information regarding patentability). A failure to obtain consent or 
fraudulently obtained consent can be sanctioned by a finding of inequitable conduct. See 
Willem Pretorius, TRIPS and Developing Countries: How Level is the Playing Field?, in 
GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 
183, 187–88 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002) (arguing for a registration require-
ment in TRIPS); see also Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origins of 
Genetic Resources and Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications Without Infringing 
the TRIPS Agreement:  The Problem and the Solution, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 371, 
PAGE (2000). 
 53. See Ricolfi, supra note 31, at 85. According to Professor Ricolfi, “a missing link 
is bound to remain unless appropriate cooperation by recipient states is not . . . put in 
place.” Id. In addition to domestic action, many countries, organizations, and scholars 
have argued that TRIPS, which does not address protection of traditional knowledge, 
should be amended to reflect the need for equitable compensation and consent, thereby 
aligning TRIPS more closely with the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD)⎯an “interna-
tional legal framework that has sought to encourage the formation of mutually beneficial 
relationships between providers and users of genetic resources based on a concept of bilat-
eral agreement.” See, e.g., Michael I. Jeffrey Q.C., Bioprospecting: Access to Genetic Re-
sources and Benefit-Sharing Under the Convention on Biodiversity and the Bonn Guide-
lines, 6 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 747, 749, 773 (2002); see also Convention on 
Biological Diversity, arts. 8(j), 16, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) (de-
scribing the guidelines for conserving and transferring traditional knowledge via equitable 
contractual arrangement); Kamal Puri, Biodiversity and Protection of Traditional Knowl-
edge, in PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 82, 84–85 (Chisum et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the 
differences between TRIPS and CBD). For instance, Kenya, on behalf of the African 
group, proposed a footnote be added to Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS to provide for “the pro-
tection of the innovations of indigenous and local farming communities in developing 
countries, consistent with the Convention on Biological Diversity and the International 
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources.” Review of the Provisions of Article 27.3(b) ¶ 
13(i), Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. 
IP/C/W163 (Nov. 8, 1999), http://docsonline.wto.org/ddfdocuments/t/IP/C/W163.doc. The 
WTO, in its recent Doha Ministerial Declaration, instructed the Counsil for TRIPS to “ex-
amine . . . the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity, the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore.” Ministerial Declara-
tion ¶ 19, Ministerial Conf., 4th Sess., WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 1999), 
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/WT/min01/DEC1.doc (adopted Nov. 14, 1999). Oxfam has recom-
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workable, approach is to encourage the formation of voluntary contrac-
tual relationships between the keepers of traditional knowledge and those 
who desire it. A prominent example is the bioprospecting agreement54 
entered into between the Instituto Nacional de Biodiveridad (INBio),55 a 
private, non-profit, Costa Rican organization, and Merck, the U.S. phar-
maceutical company.56 The terms of the Merck agreement are confiden-
tial, but it is known that Merck paid INBio $1.35 million in return for 
10,000 samples of flora, soil, and insects collected by INBio and for in-
mended that the “TRIPS regime should be harmonised (sic) with the Convention on Bio-
diversity.” Oxfam, Cut the Cost—Patent Injustice: How World Trade Rules Threaten the 
Health of Poor People, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/cutthecost/downloads/patent.pdf (Feb. 
2001); see also Pretorius, supra note 52, at 187–88 (asserting that “TRIPS should . . . con-
tain a requirement that the enforcement of patent rights should be subject to the disclosure, 
at the time of registration, of the country of origin of biological materials and/or traditional 
knowledge”). The United States, however, has resisted amendments to TRIPS relating to 
traditional knowledge, prompting commentators such as Professor Graham Dutfield to 
remark, “It seems highly unlikely that a new framework to protect [traditional knowledge] 
will be inserted into TRIPS anytime soon.” Dutfield, supra note 2, at 273. 
 54. I use this term only to refer to a mutually beneficial contract between a develop-
ing nation and either a private concern (e.g., a pharmaceutical company) or a developed 
nation. Sometimes these agreements are referred to as “Material Transfer Agreements” 
(MTAs). See generally Secretariat, Operational Principles for Intellectual Property 
Clauses of Contractual Agreements Concerning Access to Generic Resources and Benefit 
Sharing 6, WIPO Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. And Genetic Resources, Tra-
ditional Knowledge and Folklore 2d Sess., WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/3 (Sept. 10, 
2001), http://www.wipo.org/eng/meeting/2001/igc/pdf/grtkfic2_3.pdf (DATE) (explaining 
the usage of the term “MTA”) [hereinafter WIPO Operational Principles]. A properly 
drafted bioprospecting agreement should be consistent with the goals of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD). See supra note 53; see also WIPO Operational Principles, 
supra (providing information on extant contractual practices and related intellectual prop-
erty clauses for access to and benefit-sharing of genetic resources); McManis, supra note 
21, at 270 (noting that a “consensus is developing among scientists, world bodies, anthro-
pologists, and conservationists, that the best way for developing countries to capture the 
benefits of biodiversity is through a system of intellectual property, environmental, and 
contractual protection designed to harmonize the goals of development and conservation 
by building an international framework for sustainable biodiversity prospecting”). 
 55.  INBio states that it is an “institution leader in the search and popularization of 
the knowledge about biodiversity and its sustainable uses” and its mission is to “[p]romote 
a new awareness of the value of biodiversity, and thereby achieve its conservation and use 
to improve the quality of life.” Instituto Nacional de Biodiveridad, at 
http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/default.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2003). 
 56. See Christopher Joyce, Prospectors for Tropical Medicines, NEW SCIENTIST, 
Oct. 19, 1991, at 36, 36–39 (describing the Merck/INBio agreement). INBio also has nu-
merous contractual arrangements with other private companies and academic institutions. 
See, e.g., Agreements with Academia, Instituto Nacionale de Biodiversidad, at 
http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdb/ 
academicos.htm (DATE) (listing INBio’s academic agreements); Agreements with the 
Industrial Sector, Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad, at 
http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdb/comerciales.htm (listing INBio’s industrial agreements) 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2003).  
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formation about how these samples have been traditionally used.57 Merck 
is also obligated to pay INBio royalties on future sales of products devel-
oped from the samples, which in turn are to be invested, in part, in con-
servation efforts.58
The seed for this type of contractual agreement was planted by the 
idea of “chemical prospecting,” which Thomas Eisner, who coined the 
phase, defined as an “exploratory process by which new, useful natural 
products are discovered.”59 Eisner advocated that developing nations, be-
cause of their geographic proximity to and interest in conserving their 
biodiversity, could act as screening laboratories that would, in a non-
invasive manner, search natural products for chemical and biological ac-
tivities and isolate the active components of these products.60 According 
to Eisner: 
The inevitable follow-up to the discovery of chemical uses of selected organisms 
would be the establishment of working linkages with universities and indus-
tries⎯initially, perhaps, mostly in developed nations⎯that would undertake the 
characterization and synthesis of the active chemicals uncovered. At that stage, 
proprietary arrangements could be made to insure that profits derived from the 
eventual commercialization of the new chemicals revert in fair measure to the 
nations that did the screening.61
 57. See Frank J. Penna & Coenraad J. Visser, Cultural Industries and Intellectual 
Property Rights 390, 397, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK (Ber-
nard Hoekman et al. eds., 2002).  
 58. See Bioprospecting Agreement, Insituto Nacional de Biodiversidad, at 
http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdb/acuerdos.htm. INBio describes their bioprospecting agree-
ments as follows: 
Each agreement has its corresponding work plan and research budget that estab-
lishes a 10% donation to the Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía (MINAE) (Min-
istry of the Environment and Energy), which helps cover direct biodiversity con-
servation costs. Furthermore, it contributes to increasing services, species 
identification, sample collection and preparation, collection records, information 
management, training, management. . . .  
. . . 
  In prospecting, the processes are executed in conjunction with research cen-
ters, universities, and national and international companies. This network of as-
sociations makes state-of-the-art technologies available and provides the oppor-
tunity to rapidly and efficiently train Costa Rican scientists as well as laboratory 
and field personnel. At the same time, this type of collaboration generates finan-
cial resources that are used to fund the country’s conservation activities, and also 
other research projects oriented towards satisfying the demands of users who 
contribute to the country’s sustainable development. 
Id.  
 59. Eisner, supra note 19, at 196. 
 60. See id. at 200–01. 
 61. Id. at 201; see also Bioprospecting Agreements, Insituto Nacional de Biodiversi-
dad, at http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdb/acuerdos.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2003). Other 
prominent examples of bioprospecting arrangements include efforts made by the National 
Cancer Institute (NCI). See generally Edgar J. Asebey & Jill D. Kempenaar, Biodiversity 
Prospecting: Fulfilling the Mandate of the Biodiversity Convention, 28 VAND. J. 
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The nature and nuances of bioprospecting agreements are complex 
and variable,62 and they are not without problems.63 Particularly trou-
bling issues include asymmetrical bargaining power, domestic technol-
ogy-transfer management (e.g., the ability to screen and organize tradi-
tional knowledge and representative legitimacy at the bargaining table), 
and internal institutional concerns (e.g., the establishment of a legal 
framework or comparable structure that recognizes and properly assigns 
ownership interests in traditional knowledge; determines who should col-
lect, manage, and equitably distribute royalties; and monitors such to as-
sure probity in the collection and distribution).64
TRANSNAT’L L. 703, 719–24 (1995) (detailing the efforts of the NCI). The NCI has 
awarded millions of dollars to non-profit organizations to engage in research in biodiver-
sity-rich countries in Central and South America, Asia, and Africa. Id. Although under the 
contracts the NCI will own any resulting patent rights, the developing country will receive 
royalty payments, a representative from that country will be listed as a co-discover, and 
the NCI will offer technical training to local personal. Id. The NCI’s “Letter of Collection” 
states: 
While investigating the potential of natural products in drug discovery and de-
velopment, NCI wishes to promote conservation of biological diversity, and 
recognizes the need to compensate source country organizations and peoples in 
the event of commercialization of a drug developed from an organism collected 
within their borders. . . . The NCI will make sincere efforts to transfer knowl-
edge, expertise, and technology related to drug discovery and development to 
the [appropriate Source Country Institution] in [Source Country] as the agent 
appointed by the [Source Country Government or Source Country Organiza-
tion], subject to the provision of mutually acceptable guarantees for the protec-
tion of intellectual property associated with any patented technology. 
National Cancer Institute, Letter of Collection, ¶¶ 1–2 (obtained from correspondence with 
Dr. Gordon Cragg, National Products Branch, NCI) (on file with the author). The NCI’s 
“Memorandum of Understanding” uses virtually identical language. Two commentators 
have called the NCI “one of the leaders in implementing the mandates of the Biodiversity 
Convention.” Asebey & Kempenaar, supra, at 720. 
 62. For a discussion of the principles and operation of contractual arrangements re-
lating to traditional knowledge, see WIPO Operational Principles, supra note 54.  
 63. The agreement between INBio and Merck has been criticized by a variety of au-
thors. See, e.g., Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 61, at 726–30; Neil D. Hamilton, Who 
Owns Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanisms for Ownership of Plant Genetic Resources, 28 
TULSA L.J. 587, 627–29 (1993); Shayana Kadidal, Plants, Poverty, and Pharmaceutical 
Patents, 103 YALE L.J. 223, 234–35 (1993); Kirsten Peterson, Recent Intellectual Prop-
erty Trends in Developing Countries, 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 277, 288–89 (1992); see gener-
ally Klaus Bosselmann, Plants and Politics: The International Legal Regime Concerning 
Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 111, 141–45 (1996) 
(criticizing the current system of preserving biodiversity). 
 64. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY 
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE PAGE (2000) (dis-
cussing the institutional problems in the developing world associated with managing capi-
tal and recognizing property rights); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE 
ECONOMIC ANSWER TO TERRORISM PAGE (1989) (same). A partial solution to these con-
cerns is to create a non-profit organization as a centralized coordinating entity. But as Pro-
fessor Visser has experienced from his work in Venezuela, the indigenous tribes have con-
cerns about the creation of a corporate entity. See Visser, supra note 44, at 769–70. He 
IN DEFENSE OF GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY.NARD.REV 10/16/2003 1:09 PM 
234 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 88:221 
 
 
Nonetheless, these contractual arrangements are a positive devel-
opment. They reflect an implicit concession that developing nations 
should be compensated for their traditional knowledge and that devel-
oped countries have a vested interest in biodiversity conservation. Bio-
prospecting agreements also create wealth for keepers of the traditional 
knowledge and developing nations, wealth that can be invested in, 
among other things, research and development, health care, conservation, 
or general infrastructure.65 Moreover, developing nations and indigenous 
peoples do not incur the often prohibitively high cost of obtaining and 
enforcing patent rights.66 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, bio-
prospecting agreements will yield the commercialization of medicines 
that will benefit many more lives than would be the case absent a meet-
ing of the minds. 
While there is a tendency to adopt a paternalistic attitude when dis-
cussing patent rights and the developing world, and while Western no-
tions of property rights frequently differ from those of indigenous peo-
ples,67 it is worth noting the results of an extensive empirical study 
conducted by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).68 In 
1998 and 1999, WIPO conducted nine fact-finding missions in twenty-
eight countries to discern the “IP needs and expectations of TK 
[traditional knowledge] holders.”69 These missions resulted in several in-
teresting findings; most notably, WIPO found that “[d]espite criticism of 
IP laws . . . by certain informants, many others expressed interest in ex-
ploring further the actual and potential role of the IP system in TK pro-
tection,”70 and informants also expressed the desire to facilitate a “dia-
logue and contact between TK holders, the private sector, governments, 
[non-governmental organizations], and other stakeholders to assist in 
developing modalities for cooperation between them, at community, na-
tional, regional and international levels.”71 As the Indigenous Peoples 
Secretariat submitted, the WIPO report “could focus on the fact that [the] 
states that the tribal elders “see the corporation as supplanting the traditional authority 
structure in the tribes.” Id. at 770. 
 65. See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
 66. See Penna & Visser, supra note 57, at 397 (asserting that a “basic problem” with 
holders of traditional knowledge obtaining patents themselves “is that a patent protects 
active ingredients that have been isolated and tested” and “[s]uch isolation and testing may 
cost hundreds of millions of dollars and are out of reach for most developing countries, let 
alone their indigenous peoples”). 
 67. See, e.g., Kamal Puri, Cultural Ownership and Intellectual Property Rights Post-
Mabo: Putting Ideas Into Action, 9 INTELL. PROP. J. 293, 307–09 (1995) (arguing that 
Aboriginal communities and Western ideas of copyright differ). 
 68. See Intellectual Property Needs, supra note 2.  
 69. See id. at 17.  
 70. Id. at 223.  
 71. Id. at 218.  
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commodification [of traditional knowledge] . . . does not per se work to 
the detriment of the rights of traditional knowledge holders, but, under 
appropriate conditions to be further investigated and defined, can in fact 
work to their benefit.”72
Further investigation of the virtues and problems of patent rights in 
the developing world is in order, but given the promise of contractually 
marrying proprietary rights with traditional knowledge, cautious opti-
mism is also in order. And while Professor Bagley provides an important 
alternative, I believe that a proactive use of patent law compares favora-
bly to a system that seeks to render patent protection unavailable for 
products derived from traditional knowledge. 
 
 72. Id.  
